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Wh e n  the la s t Allied sh ips drew  away from the beaches of Dieppe on 19 A ugust 1942, 
th e y  left b e h in d  over 2 ,7 0 0  of th e  4 ,9 6 3  
C anad ians who h ad  em barked on the raid: 807 
m en were dead, including four Royal C anad ian  
Army Medical Corps [RCAMC] medical orderlies, 
an d  1,946 (including four C anad ian  Medical 
Officers (MOs), a chap la in , an d  a t le a s t 11 
RCAMC m edical orderlies and  48 accredited  
stre tch er-b eare rs) were abandoned  to G erm an 
captivity on the beaches and  environs.1 As Lord 
Lovat wrote decades after the event, “the  raid 
w as an  exceedingly b itter experience, lea rn t the 
ha rd  way.”2
It is to the fate of these nearly two th o u san d  
m en, and  in particu larly  the  568 who h ad  been 
w ounded and  th en  captured , th a t th is  article is 
devoted. M any of the survivors faced lengthy 
hospitalization  an d  rehabilita tion , frequently  
under the care of POW medical personnel ra ther 
th a n  G erm an  doctors. The a c c o u n t of th a t  
m edical trea tm ent is one of the un to ld  stories of 
the Dieppe raid.
M edical Planning
G iven th a t Dieppe w as in tended  to be a raid  of only a few h o u rs ’ duration , the m edical 
p lanning was not complicated. Typical, perhaps, 
w e re  th e  i n s t r u c t io n s  fo r th e  S o u th  
Saskatchew an Regiment:
O p p o s ite :-
Top: The beach a t Dieppe im m ediately follow ing  
the raid on 19 A ugust 1942.
B o tto m : A Canadian soldier w ith  head  w ound is 
helped by one o f his comrades follow ing their 
capture a t Dieppe, 19 A ugust 1942.
No. 11 C a n a d ia n  F ield  A m b u lan ce  h a d  b e e n  
se le c te d  a n d  tr a in e d  w ith  th e  m a in  D ieppe 
fo rc e s , th e  p la n  b e in g  to  s u p p le m e n t  th e  
reg im en ta l s t re tc h e r -b e a re r s  w ith  se c tio n s  of 
1 1 th  CFA. E a c h  se c tio n  of the  field a m b u la n c e  
w as com posed  of a n  officer a n d  11 m en . T heir 
e q u ip m e n t w as th o ro u g h ly  su p e rv ised  a n d  a n  
a tte m p t w as m ad e  to  prov ide  w h a t w as  m o s t 
su itab le . Special p ack s  consisting  largely of shell 
d ress in g s , m orph ine , s u lp h a  d ru g s  a n d  p la sm a  
w ere prov ided , a n d  th e  e q u ip m e n t w as  div ided 
so  th a t  each  m a n  h a d  som e of it to  t r a n s p o r t .3
Four tank  landing craft and two large flak landing 
craft were selected an d  equipped for hand ling  
casua lties. E ach  of the  four tan k  land ing  craft 
carried two m edical officers and  several medical 
orderlies, and  each  of the flak landing craft, one 
m edical officer p lu s m edical orderlies. The flak 
landing craft were to be grounded on the beaches 
one hour before the withdrawal was due to begin. 
Once loaded, each  craft h ad  a capacity  of 100 
c a s u a l t ie s  on  s t r e tc h e r s  a n d  60  w a lk in g  
w ounded to re tu rn  to the  United Kingdom for 
tran sfer to hospitals. But,
n o n e  of th is  h a p p e n e d . F rom  tim e  to tim e th e  
ta n k  lan d in g  c ra ft, w h ich  lay well o u t to se a  
aw a itin g  th e  call to  go in , a n sw e re d  u rg e n t 
r e q u e s ts  from  d e s tro y e rs  a n d  g u n  b o a ts  for 
m edical officers, orderlies a n d  supplies, a n d  th a t 
w a s  th e  to ta l  of th e i r  p a r t ic ip a tio n . A t te n  
m in u te s  to n ine  o’clock, a s  soon a s  it h a d  becom e 
c l e a r  to  th e  N a v a l a n d  M i l i ta r y  F o rc e  
C om m anders th a t  th e  b each es w ere n o t securely  
h e ld , th e  fo u r h o sp ita l ta n k  lan d in g  c ra f t w ere 
o rd e red  to r e tu r n  to  p o rt. Of th e  two large flak  
la n d in g  c ra ft one  d id  good service a s  a  m ed ical 
sh ip , a n d  th e  o th e r  w as  s u n k .4
By 0430 hou rs the  first casualties h ad  begun to 
come aboard  HMS Calpe and  HMS Fernie, even 
though these ships were destroyers, not hospital
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ships. Destroyers have little su rp lus space under 
any conditions, b u t the  equipm ent requ ired  to 
transfo rm  a H un t-class  destroyer su c h  as the 
Calpe into a h e a d q u arte rs  sh ip  fu rth e r lim ited 
the space th a t  m ight have been  allo tted  to the 
wounded.
N evertheless, m uch  of the  im m ediate care 
of casua ltie s  w as carried  o u t on destroyers, 
prim arily  Calpe and  Fernie, as well as on the 
gunboat Locust. Calpe a ttem pted  to cope w ith 
278 w ounded m en p lu s her own su b s ta n tia l 
n u m b er of casualties. Space in  the w ardroom  
and  in the after m ess-deck  w as soon occupied 
and, after that, the wounded lay out on the decks 
with little or no pro tection  an d  m any suffered 
add itiona l w ounds. Goronwy Rees, G eneral 
M ontgom ery’s lia ison  officer, describ ed  the  
casualties being brough t aboard  HMS Garth as 
“the grey, lifeless faces of m en whose vitality had  
been d rained  ou t of them ...T he sh ip ’s m edical 
o ffic e r  t r ie d  d e s p e r a te ly  to  im p ro v is e  
arrangem ents for blood transfusions which were 
far beyond his resources.”5 Like the o ther ships, 
Garth took the w ounded aboard  to capacity.
P lann ing  in the  U nited Kingdom for the  
re c e p tio n  of th e  ex p e c te d  c a s u a l t ie s  w as 
necessarily som ew hat more elaborate. The m ain 
reception point was to have been Stokes Bay near 
Portsm outh, with Newhaven as a secondary site. 
The m ain  dressing sta tion  was set up  a t the first 
8
location by 10th Canadian Field Ambulance, b u t 
w hen it w as learned  late  on the 19th th a t m ost 
of the  casua lties  were arriving on board  the 
destroyers a t Portsm outh, 10th Field Ambulance 
and  No.2 C anad ian  Motor A m bulance Convoy 
moved there  w ith all h a s te  and  were fully ready 
w hen Fernie  a n d  Calpe arrived  early  on 20 
A ugust. C asualties arriving a t Newhaven were 
cared for by 8 th  C anad ian  Field A m bulance. 
Ultimately, all casualties were transported  to 7th 
C anadian  General Hospital.6
Im m ediate Care of Casualties
T -eatm ent of the w ounded on the beaches followed s ta n d a rd  lines w here possib le , 
though frequently it was not. The extraordinarily 
heavy enem y fire prevented m any of the medical 
p e r s o n n e l  from  p e rfo rm in g  th e i r  d u t ie s .  
N e v e r th e le s s , m u c h  w a s  a c h ie v e d  u n d e r  
appallingly difficult conditions. One C anad ian  
who w as involved in getting in jured com patriots 
under cover and  into the h ands of the regimental 
m edical officers on White Beach was H onourary 
Captain Jo h n  Foote, padre of the Royal Hamilton 
Light Infantry, who subsequen tly  received the 
Victoria C ross for h is courageous and  selfless 
efforts.
C ap tain  D. Wesley Clare, RCAMC, w as also 
on W hite B each w here he found fire so in tense  
th a t it w as im possible to seek ou t the w ounded.
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He se t up  his aid  post in the lee of a derelict 
tan k  landing craft th a t h a d  floated in broadside 
to the  beach . His b a tta lio n  h a d  13 m en  to 
d is p e n s e  f i r s t - a id  -  tw o to  e a c h  of fo u r  
c o m p an ies , a n d  C lare  a n d  fo u r m en  w ith  
h e a d q u a r te rs  co m pany  -  b u t  th ey  qu ick ly  
becam e c a su a ltie s  them selves. “As my one 
corporal w as killed shortly  after reach ing  the 
beach, and  my sergeant was evacuated an  hour 
later on a craft th a t landed the FMR [Les Fusiliers 
Mont-Royal], I h ad  one first aid  m an  an d  my 
b a tm an  s tre tcher-bearer. The w ounded h ad  to 
help them selves or be helped behind our craft.”7
On Blue Beach, in front of Puys, the fire was 
so intense th a t little medical work could be done.
Captain Charles Robertson, RCAMC, who landed 
w ith  a  sec tio n  of th e  11 th  C a n a d ia n  Field 
A m bulance in su p p o rt of the Royal Regim ent of 
C anada, was p inned  down by enem y fire. It was 
literally im possible to ven ture  onto the beach, 
so only casualties already u n d er cover could be 
trea ted  un til after the  su rrender. “Really there 
w asn ’t anything medically th a t I or anybody else 
d id ,” R obertson recalled. “You su re  w eren’t out 
on the b each .”8
On an o th er p a rt  of Blue Beach, L ieu tenan t 
R.R. Laird w as able to care for som e of the 
w ounded Royals. He w as u n d e r cover, b u t the 
casua ltie s  h ad  to get to him  since he h ad  been 
badly  w ounded him self; the  lanyard  from his 
revolver h a d  been  blow n th ro u g h  h is  th igh  
le a v in g  one  e n d  h a n g in g  o u t  e a c h  s id e . 
U ltim ately, h is leg h ad  to be am pu ta ted , and  
Laird w as eventually repatria ted  to C anada .9
W o u n d e d  C a n a d ia n  s o l d ie r s  r e c e iv in g  m e d ic a l  
a tte n tio n  fo llo w in g  th e  D ieppe  raid.
C a p ta in  F.W. H ayter, MO of th e  S o u th  
S askatchew ans, estab lished  h is regim ental aid 
post well off the beach a t Pourville. The m ajority 
of h is casualties were re-em barked under heavy 
fire an d  H ayter him self w as able to re tu rn  to 
England u n sca th ed . He gave p a rticu la r p raise  
to th e  re g im e n ta l s t r e tc h e r - b e a re r s ,  w ho 
perform ed prodigiously u n d e r heavy fire: “The 
m ajority  of casu a ltie s  am ong the s tre tc h e r-  
b e a re rs  o ccu rred  w hile they  w ere ca rry in g  
wounded across the beach, some of them  m aking 
repeated  tr ip s .”10
A bove: C anadian prisoners fo rm ed  up on a  street in 
Dieppe. Front row left is Honourary Captain John  
Foote, the padre  o f the Hamilton Light Infantry, 
w ho  w a s  a w a rd e d  th e  Victoria Cross fo r  h is  
gallantry in tending to the w ounded  during the  
raid. Front row right is Captain D. Wesley Clare, a  
medical officer who landed on White Beach.
L eft: Canadian soldiers being m arched into captivity.
The Men Left Behind
O n ce  th e  w h ite  flag  h a d  b e e n  ra is e d , im m ediate efforts were m ade to tre a t the 
w ounded . G enerally, the  G erm ans behaved  
correctly  an d  a ss is te d  the w ounded m en in 
various ways. Som etim es no m ore th a n  a sip of 
w a te r  o r a l ig h te d  c ig a re t te ,  th e s e  w ere 
nevertheless appreciated  gestu res. D ressings 
were applied, m orphine adm inistered, m akeshift 
stre tchers  rigged, and  slowly the beaches began 
to be c leared . For som e m en, su c co u r w as 
delayed after RAF fighter-bom bers sw ept along 
the b each  after the su rrender. The G erm ans 
stopped  picking up  the w ounded a t th is  time, 
and  a t least one m an lay there  un til d u s k .12
The MO for the  Q u een ’s Own C am eron  
H ighlanders of W innipeg, C ap ta in  B rackm an, 
was severely w ounded. Seen floating face down 
in the water, he was recovered and  retu rned  with 
the other casualties to England. At Bemeval, the 
MO w ith the com m andos, Sam  Corry, h ad  both  
legs broken by m achine-gun bullets. And Captain 
Laurence Alexander, MO with the Calgary Tanks, 
was blown off a land ing  craft by a n e a r  m iss. 
Climbing back  on, he con tinued  to care for the 
w ounded.11
Some C anad ians found the initial a tten tion  
th e ir  w ounded  m ates  received w as cu rso ry  
indeed. Lucien D um ais w as quite critical:
E nfin , u n  m edec in  arrive  p o u r  voir les b le sse s .
S a  v isite  n ’e s t q u ’u n  s im u lac re . II reg a rd e  u n e  
d izaine de b le sse s  et, s a n s  avoir to u ch e  u n  seu l 
p a n se m e n t, n i essay e  de so u la n g e r  qu i q u e  ce 
soit, n i env isage de les d iriger vers u n  hop ita l, il 
rep a rt!  Ils v o n t done p a s s e r  la  n u i t  avec n o u s  
d a n s  ce c h a n  tie r!13
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Furtherm ore, there  are reports th a t some of the 
w ounded were executed by G erm ans after the 
su rren d e r. J a c k  Poolton (Royal Regim ent of 
Canada) s ta ted  th a t a t Puys,
th e re  w ere tw o G e rm a n  officers dow n th e re  
ac tu a lly  sh o o tin g  th e  w o rs t of th e  w o u n d ed , 
p u tt in g  them  o u t of th e ir  m isery . I a c tu a lly  saw  
th is  one G erm an  officer sh o o t a t  le a s t th ree . He 
w as p u tt in g  b u lle ts  th ro u g h  th e ir  fo reh ead s.
E ven  th o u g h  I rea lised  th ey  w ere do ing  it a s  a n  
a c t of m ercy, I d id n ’t w a n t to see  an y  m ore 
b e c a u se  it m ad e  m e sick.
No o ther writer seem s to have docum ented  this 
event, b u t Poolton twice confirmed his account.14 
C ertainly killing badly  w ounded m en as a  so rt 
of eu thanasia  w as not outside the boundaries of 
know n behav iour by G erm an an d  Ja p a n e se  
forces during  the Second World War. A B ritish 
s u rg e o n  c a p tu re d  a t  A rn h em  re c o rd e d  a 
conversation he h ad  w ith SS m edical officers: 
“Only the simpler casualties are worth bothering 
abou t, the ones w hich will live un til they reach  
the base. Any other approach is sentim entality , 
n o t surgery . For the  res t?  Well, in  th is  Division 
we have a usefu l equation: ‘B auchschuss Oder 
K opfschuss -  SpritzenF  [Belly w ound or head  
w ound -  M orphia Injection!]”15
Trooper J o h n  Lerigo, of No.3 Com m ando, 
reported  th a t he saw  G erm ans bayoneting  the 
wounded. This seem s to describe not eu thanasia  
b u t ra th e r  sim ple m urder. And w hat m ay have 
been  a n e a r m iss h as  also been recorded from 
No. 4 Com m ando, w here medical orderly Jam es 
Pasquale was one of six whom the G erm ans lined 
u p  aga in st a d itch. “They never sa id  any th ing  
b u t it w as obvious w hat w as going to h a p p e n .” 
However, a nattily  dressed  G erm an officer came 
along and  in terceded .16
By m id-afternoon of 19 August, perhaps 500 
C anad ian  POWs h ad  been  collected in  a  park  
ad jacen t to the G erm an m ilitary hosp ita l on 
D ieppe’s Avenue Pasteur. Here, p resum ably , 
m any of the w ounded received som e m edical 
a tten tion , a t least to the  extent of applying or 
changing dressings. The G erm ans requisitioned 
local am bu lances to tra n sp o rt the  w orst of the 
injured, especially G erm an soldiers. In general, 
“les b lesses anglais so n t a p ied ,” though  th is 
sam e Dieppois also reported  seeing a w ounded 
C anadian  POW being moved by am bulance .17 At 
Berneval-le-G rand, the w ounded p risoners had  
been well treated, chiefly by the inhabitan ts. The
G erm ans had  perm itted them  to provide the m en 
w ith  drinking  w ater an d  to help care for their 
w ounds.
In  th is  im m e d ia te  p o s t - b a t t l e  s ta g e , 
em ergency m edical care w as provided by the 
C anad ians , G erm an m ilitary personnel, and  
F re n ch  civilians. In s ta n c e s  are  reco rded  of 
G erm an troops carrying w ounded on stretchers, 
th o u g h  c o m m o n ly  th e  G e rm a n s  h a d  fit 
C anad ians carry their w ounded com rades. One 
m an  rem em bers “walking through broken glass 
carrying wounded up  to the hospital in Dieppe. ”'s 
For those who survived, m ore su b s ta n tia l aid 
w ould be given in various hospitals.
1. H ospitals
T ie  first w ounded C anad ians seem  to have arrived a t l’Hotel-Dieu, the m ain  hospital in 
Dieppe, abou t noon on the 19th. One of the 
sis te rs  saw  th a t they had  no medical officers, so 
a  F rench  physician  an d  a n u rsin g  s is te r  were 
re q u e s te d . S oon  th e  m o th e r  s u p e r io r  w as 
assisting  them  herself. She also arranged for the 
s is te rs  in  the  h osp ita l ph arm acy  to provide 
com presses, bandages, syringes, needles, and  
a m p u le s  of m ed ic ine . Oil of c a m p h o r w as 
injected in an  a ttem pt to stim ulate the heart, an 
intern gave tetanus shots, and the sisters brought 
food from the hospital gardens. D uring the night 
of 19/20 August, the Canadians, fit and wounded, 
were rem oved from l’Hotel-Dieu. By m orning, 
on ly  e ig h t of th e  m o s t sev ere ly  w o u n d e d  
rem ained . One h ad  a frac tu red  sk u ll .19 O ther 
casualties were taken  first to l’Hotel Rhin. Some 
h ad  first aid  carried  ou t there, b u t th en  m ost of 
these  m en w ent e ither to l’Hotel Dieu or to the 
railway sta tion .20
P robab ly  on  th e  evening  of 19 A ugust, 
C ap ta in  C harles R obertson  accom panied  his 
w ounded colleague, C aptain  R.R. “Pinky” Laird, 
RCAMC, in an  am bulance to the Dieppe railway 
station. There Robertson w as com m andeered by 
a  G erm an m edical officer to a ss is t in the triage 
of the  m any  h u n d red s  of w ounded, separa ting  
the seriously  w ounded from less serious cases 
an d  directing G erm an s tre tcher-bearers  to take 
them  to different tra in s .21 The so-called “light 
w o u n d e d ” w ere s e n t to V erneuil, th e  m ore 
seriously  w ounded to hosp ita ls  in  Rouen. Fit 
POWs, an d  m any light w ounded who preferred 
to s tay  w ith their friends, were m arched  first to
Enverm eu, an d  then , after in terrogation , to a 
tran s it cam p a t Verneuil, 130 kilom etres so u th  
of Dieppe.
Many of the wounded had  some surgical care 
there before going on to POW hospitals or camps. 
The in jured  m en were tran sp o rted  by tru c k  or 
tra in , so a t  le a s t w ere sp a re d  w alk ing . At 
Verneuil, the three fit Canadian MOs, Robertson, 
Walmsley, an d  Clare, and  a t least one G erm an 
d oc to r s p e n t two days rem oving  p ieces  of 
s h ra p n e l  u n d e r  local a n a e s th e t ic ,  s e tt in g  
fractures, and  su tu ring  w ounds.
O ther survivors were sen t to R ouen on 19 
A ugust, m aking the trip  in railway boxcars or 
trucks. M any veterans have painfu l m em ories 
of the ir im m ediate m edical care, especially the 
severely w ounded. This is hard ly  su rprising . 
Often they had  m ultiple injuries, and some m en 
are still incensed, 50 years later, th a t all of their 
w ounds were no t cared for a t th is  stage. One 
m an, w hose leg was u ltim ately  am p u ta ted  a t 
Rouen, criticized the care he received. W ounds 
in h is arm  an d  his head  were no t trea ted  a t all, 
though the G erm ans did p u t a cast on h is leg.22
According to more th an  one veteran, a t least 
som e of the p a tie n ts  tre a te d  a t R ouen  h a d  
surgical p rocedures done w ithout anaesthesia . 
Robert P rouse of the C anad ian  Provost Corps 
worked in the R ouen hosp ita l after receiving
trea tm en t for h is own sh rap n e l w ounds in the 
calf. He found th a t h is du ty  w as to hold down 
soldiers while they were operated  on. “We were 
anaesthetists, one for each arm  and  one for each 
leg. E ither there  were no an aes th e tics  or the 
G erm ans did no t w ant to w aste them  on u s .”23
In assessing  any such  claim, it m ust be kept 
in m ind th a t m uch  rough and  ready trea tm en t 
is carried  ou t in em ergency situa tions involving 
large n u m b ers  of casualties. The G erm ans no t 
only h ad  responsibility  th ru s t  on them  for 600 
Allied casualties, b u t they also h ad  326 of their 
own w ounded  who requ ired  care .24 No local 
m ilita ry  m ed ic a l e s ta b l is h m e n t  c a n  cope 
in stan taneously  and  effectively with m ore th an  
900 casualties, m any very severe, that have been 
su s ta in ed  in a few h o u rs ’ fighting in a sm all 
geographical area. In cases w here the  w ounds 
are (from the comfort of the historian’s arm chair) 
“m inor” in  n a tu re , trea tm en t is usually  cursory  
in the  initial stages. This triage occurs in peace 
as in  war, and  w hether casua lties  are friend or 
foe. Moreover, there  were apparen tly  cu ltu ra l 
differences in the  use  of anaesthesia . A B ritish  
su rgeon  left beh ind  a t D unkirk  observed th is, 
noting th a t a Belgian surgeon  w as inclined “to 
do th in g s  w i th o u t  o r w ith  in s u f f ic ie n t  
anaesthetic. High s tan d ard  anaesthetics were a 
B ritish luxury  no t to be found on the C ontinent 
in the years betw een the w ars .”25
C a n a d ia n  w o u n d e d  a w a i t  tr e a tm e n t fo l lo w in g  th e  raid.
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Finally, th ree  C anad ians (C aptain  Robert 
H ainau lt of M ontreal, Corporal Melville Parker 
of T oronto , a n d  Private A delard de Seve of 
M ontreal) and  one Briton received trea tm en t at 
the  Hopital de la Pitie in  Paris after the ir initial 
evaluation at D ieppe and  im m ediate surgery  at 
R ouen.26 Parker and  de Seve m ade the trip from 
Rouen to Paris on 26 A ugust 1942, b u t H ainault 
w a s  n o t  t r a n s f e r r e d  u n t i l  10 N ovem ber, 
p re su m a b ly  b e c a u se  of the  severity  of h is 
in juries. The four m en were housed  in  a  fairly 
large isolation w ard in  one of the  build ings of 
the  hospital, in the M axillo-Facial D epartm ent. 
According to the Red Cross, the accom m odation 
an d  food were “in every respect excellent and  
exactly  s im ila r to th o se  to be found  in an  
absolu tely  up -to -da te  Parisian  hospital, w hich 
is now being u sed  by the G erm an arm y for the 
care of its own so ld iers .”27 P arker’s disfiguring 
facial w ounds req u ired  resto ra tive  surgery , 
which he received from a  Germ an medical officer 
a t La Pitie who w as a specialist in  th is  field.28 
C learly , th e se  th re e  m en  received  m edical 
a tten tion  of a s tan d a rd  th a t probably would not 
have been  su rp assed  in  the  UK.
2. Transportation
The G e rm an s  p rov ided  v a ried  m e a n s  of transporta tion  to move the casualties away 
from Dieppe and  its environs, and  from Verneuil 
a n d  R ouen  in to  G erm any. E xcep ting  som e 
severely  w ounded  w ho rem a in ed  longer in 
Dieppe hosp ita ls, m any of the m en, w ounded 
an d  unw ounded, left the city on the 19th.
W hen they left Rouen, some fortunate m en -  
a m inority -  were transported  by hospita l train . 
For most, the accommodation was more austere. 
From  Verneuil, all the w ounded seem  to have 
been moved in boxcars, an  u n p leasan t su rprise  
for the  C anad ian  MOs who h ad  been  looking 
after them , an d  a grim  an d  painful tim e for the 
wounded. After treating over 250 casualties with 
m inim al equipm ent, the  MOs were shocked  to 
find th a t the serious s tre tch er cases were to be 
tra n sp o rte d  in  th is  way. In one boxcar, 21 
s tre tc h e r  ca ses  w ere crow ded in  w ith  four 
C anad ian  m edical orderlies and  C aptains Clare 
an d  R obertson.29
Though travelling by cattle car was standard  
p ractice for E u ropean  arm ies, POWs m oved in 
th is  way were usua lly  overcrowded an d  u n d e r ­
supp lied  w ith food an d  o ther necessities. Food 
w as on som e occasions denied to the POWs; 
w hen  a group of G erm an Red C ross w orkers a t 
one railw ay s ta tio n  tried  to give them  food and  
drink , the  guard s  knocked the food from their 
h an d s . Som etim es conditions in the  boxcars 
were truly barbarous. One m em ber of the Royals 
found the  trip  a n igh tm are  in w hich he was 
w racked  by halluc inations. Among h is several 
injuries, he had  been s tru ck  in the back; “in the 
ha lluc ina tions the G erm ans h ad  me an d  there 
were coils of barbed  wire and  they had  the small 
of my back  b e n t backw ards over th is  pile of 
ba rb ed  wire an d  they were w rapping wire all 
a ro u n d  my right sho u ld er.” Later he found the 
cause  of h is ha lluc ina to ry  s ta te . He h ad  been 
heavily dosed w ith m orphine by his own officers, 
on the principle th a t he w as n o t going to live 
anyway. “Might as well p u t the poor bugger out 
of h is m isery .”30
One of the B ritish  m edical officers who saw 
the C anadians arrive a t O berm assfeld had  quite 
unp leasan t recollections of their state about eight 
to ten  days after the Dieppe Raid: “These people 
ju s t  fell o u t — absolu tely  w hacked. Covered in 
excreta an d  in  a terrib le s ta te . They’d been  in 
there  for days. Things w e’d read  abou t, and 
im possible to describe — the stench, the horror, 
the  tragedy of it a ll.”31
3. Prisoner o f War Camps
In  one  re s p e c t ,  th e  D ieppe  POW s w ere p a rticu la rly  fo rtu n a te  -  if they  h ad  to be 
p risoners a t all -  to en te r captivity in  1942. By 
the middle of th is year the general level of health  
of POWs in G erm an an d  Italian  h a n d s  reached 
its h ighest po in t in the  entire war. M any POWs 
m ade sta tem en ts to th is effect. One of these was 
L ie u te n a n t- C o lo n e l  L eslie  Le S o e u f , a n  
A ustralian MO captured  on Crete, who spent the 
rem ainder of the  w ar in the  bag. In h is m em oir 
he published a graph showing swings in the state 
of h ea lth  of w estern  POWs during  these  years. 
My research  suggests th a t  th is ch a rt h as  broad 
applicability as a generalization.32 [see ch a rt on 
next page.]
a. Lam sdorf
T ie  m ajority of the fit NCOs and  O ther Ranks from  D ieppe, a long  w ith  a  s u b s ta n t ia l  
p ro p o rtio n  of th e  lig h t w o u n d ed , w e n t to
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Lam sdorf (now Lambinowice in w estern Poland). 
S talag  8B, the division of the  huge S ta lag  8 
complex th a t held the  C anad ians, the  B ritish, 
and  other w estern Allied POWs, was itself a very 
large camp.-33 In 1944, th is camp was designated 
S talag  344. It held a t various tim es betw een 
10,000 and  20,000 POWs, w ith more in various 
work kom m andos a ttach ed  adm inistratively  to 
the cam p. At various tim es there  were also 
in ternal com pounds where special groups were 
held in segregation from the res t of the  cam p.
T here  w as a revier  (m edical in sp e c tio n  
room) w ith in  the cam p, and  also a lazaret, or 
hospital, in its own enclosure outside the  m ain  
cam p wire. This hospital, in to  w hich the  m ost 
severely w ounded C an ad ian s  w ent, h a d  six 
w ards, each  in a separa te  building, an d  w as an  
efficient facility th a t passed  one of the  crucial 
t e s t s :  d e s p i te  p o te n t ia l  p ro b le m s  w ith  
steriliza tion , it h a d  little  sep sis , excep t for 
w ounds th a t  cam e in  already infected.
In add ition  to the  MOs, there  were tra ined  
B ritish m edical orderlies who w orked on the 
various w ards for abou t three m onths a t a  time, 
ro ta ting  so th a t  no one was too long exposed to 
diseases su ch  as tuberculosis.34 These orderlies 
seem  to have provided a high level of care on 
the w ards. M any of them  had  been  well tra ined  
in the ir special field before the  war, an d  since 
cap ture  they h ad  had  years of work u n d e r first- 
rate  m edical officers to hone their skills and
challenge their capacity to improvise. Moreover, 
the w orking conditions a t Lam sdorf acted  to 
improve care for the w ounded and  the sick:
we w ere on  d u ty  24 h o u rs  a  day, you s e e . . .You 
w ere th e re  on  call a t  an y  tim e. W hich d id n 't 
m a tte r  b ecau se  there  w as n o th ing  else to do. B ut 
i t  m e a n t  t h a t  p e o p le  g o t q u ic k  t r e a tm e n t  
w hereas, even in  an  ordinary  hospital, they m ight 
h av e  h a d  to  w ait a  w hile till a  n ig h t s is te r  cam e 
a ro u n d .35
Supplies of all k inds were chronically scarce in 
the hosp ita l an d  revier. As a consequence, the 
orderlies u sed  to b reak  into the G erm an supply  
area to steal w hat was required. “We had  a laddie 
with us  who was a professional burglar. He could 
open any  door, and  he w as m ost u sefu l.”36
W hen the C anadian w ounded arrived, m any 
were bu rdened  with p laster casts  th a t h ad  been 
applied a t Dieppe, Rouen, or Verneuil, an d  by 
th is tim e these  were p us-soaked  and  stinking. 
One p a tien t w as especially m em orable: asked  
where he was wounded, he replied th a t h is right 
arm  w as all right. Though the m edical staff 
th o u g h t he h a d  m isunderstood  or w as being 
sm art, w hen they exam ined him  they found he 
h ad  been  quite  literal; h is righ t arm  an d  only 
h is righ t arm  w as all right. He h a d  21 w ounds 
sca ttered  abou t the res t of h is body.37
In general, there  were correct, though  no t 
cordial, relations between the POW medical staff
C la n d e s t in e  p h o to g r a p h  o f  o p era tin g  room  s c e n e  in  th e  la z a r e t  o f  S ta la g  8B , L a m sd o r f, ca. 1 9 4 3 , 
s h o w in g  f e m u r  b e in g  s a w n  th ro u g h  in  a n  u p p er-leg  a m p u ta tio n .
and  the G erm an staff doctors. The POW doctors 
were allowed full liberty  in the  p rofessional 
tre a tm e n t of the ir pa tien ts . A lthough it was 
im possible to ob tain  m edical in s tru m e n ts  in 
Germany, the British doctors had  their own sets 
of in s t ru m e n ts .38 W ehrkreis 8 a lso  h a d  an  
impressive prosthesis program  th a t included not 
only a laboratory , b u t also a close w orking 
r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  a p ro fe s s io n a l G e rm a n  
prosthetic  engineer in a neighbouring town.
b. Molsdorf, M iihlhausen, and E ichstatt
T ire e  o ther cam ps also housed  C anad ians from Dieppe. Stalag 9C Molsdorf was alm ost 
a  tra n s it camp. The m en sen t there  arrived ju s t  
before the  end  of A ugust 1942, a n d  on 20 
September, they were moved because of repeated 
escape a ttem pts. They travelled by boxcar to 
M iih lhausen , w here they  occupied a new  and  
supposed ly  escape-proof build ing.39 Only light 
w ounded were received here; no th ing  in their 
trea tm en t s ta n d s  o u t as significantly different 
from  o th e r  cam ps. Finally, 117 C a n a d ian s  
cap tu red  a t Dieppe (97 officers, including  four 
who were w ounded, an d  20 ordortnances or 
orderlies) were in  Oflag 7B E ic h s ta tt in  the 
a u tu m n  of 1 9 4 2 .40 E ic h s ta tt  w as severe ly  
overcrowded and, though the m en were generally 
in good health, the winter of 1942-43 was bitterly 
cold an d  the supp ly  of coal w as scanty . As a
consequence, there  w as a m ajor o u tb reak  of 
ch ilb la in s , rh e u m a tic  d iso rd e rs , a n d  ch e s t 
d iseases.41
4. POW H ospitals
Whatever the deficiencies of the Germ an POW hospital system  m ay have been in 1942, it 
w as a  b e tte r system  th a n  had  existed in 1940. 
W hen large n u m b ers  of B ritish  a n d  F rench  
soldiers becam e POWs in F rance an d  Belgium, 
the  b e s t the G erm ans could do w as to leave 
cap tu red  m edical u n its  intact, and  perm it them  
to u se  the ir own supp lies and  equ ipm ent to get 
on w ith their work. As one rep a tria ted  m edical 
officer p u t it, “I th in k  I can  fairly say th a t a t this 
stage, following the invasion and  fall of France, 
no m edical organization h ad  been  w orked out 
by the  G erm ans for p riso n e rs .”42
For the Dieppe casualties, especially the most 
severe, W ehrkreis 9 w as the  G erm an  defence 
a re a  they  cam e to know  well. This w as the 
territory bound, roughly, by Frankfurt-am -M ain 
in the west, S tu ttgart in the south , Leipzig to the 
east, and  Kassel to the north. It included medical 
facilities for POWs a t  O berm assfeld, K loster 
Haina, B adSoden/Salm iinster, Flildburghausen, 
S tad troda , and  Egendorf.
a. Oberm assfeld
Ab o u t 180 of the  m ost severely w ounded  Dieppe survivors were sen t to the 400-bed  
POW hospital a t Obermassfeld, a few kilom etres 
so u th  of M einingen. The build ing had  been  an  
agricu ltu ra l or forestry school before the  war, 
b u t  in  th e  a u tu m n  of 1940 th e  G e rm a n s  
designated  it a POW hospital, one of several 
created  to provide care for the  m any casua lties  
cap tu red  a t the fall of France.
One of the  B ritish  m edical officers who 
helped estab lish  the hospital arrived ju s t  before 
C hristm as 1940. The build ing w as em pty, and  
h ad  large dorm itories th a t  eventually  m ade 
suitable wards. The site was in the country, and  
one fea tu re  m arked  it as being different from 
m ost o ther POW hosp ita ls  in  Germ any: there  
was a dairy  factory, the  Molcherei, ad jacen t 
which provided the building with abundan t heat. 
“We were centrally  hea ted  from the factory, and  
we were very well heated . In fact it w as alm ost 
too powerful. B ut it w as very comforting. We 
never suffered from the  cold in  the winter, an d  
we always h ad  hot w ater.”43
On th e  w hole, th e  m ed ical s ta ff  fo u n d  
O berm assfe ld  rea so n a b ly  sa tis fa c to ry . The
G erm an  q u a rte rm a s te r  sold S e k t  (spark ling  
wine) to the  m edical officers, on the principle 
th a t the  in tended  consum ers, the civilians of 
Obermassfeld, were not used to such  luxury, and 
besides he could m ake som e m oney th is  w ay.44 
But despite th is comfortably civilized beginning, 
O berm ass-feld  POW H ospital seem s never to 
have been  a happy  in stitu tion , largely because  
of an  active and  interfering A bw ehr  detachm ent 
th a t w as determ ined  to search  and  investigate 
w hatever seem ed appropriate . As one orderly 
recalled, “san ita ters  [Germ an medical orderlies] 
m ain ta ined  an  alm ost co n s ta n t patro l th rough  
the whole place purely  to en su re  th a t in te rnal 
discipline according to the ir ru les w as abided 
by to the  hilt. Those found tran sg ressin g  often 
found them selves in a stone cell for a week. Even 
a double am putation case once went through the 
pun ishm en t.”45
Life a t O berm assfeld w as m ade u n p leasan t 
for bo th  m edical staff an d  p a tien ts  by the rigid 
stance  of the  Chejarzt, H auptm ann  Dr. M artin  
Falke. He took charge in  early 1942 an d  proved 
to be “m ost difficult to deal w ith ,” in the  words 
of a British dental officer who was SBMO [Senior 
B ritish  M edical Officer] for a sh o rt period th a t 
sum m er. The C hejarzt a s su m e d  d ic ta to ria l 
powers an d  “gave certa in  orders w hich I could
only obey u n d er pro test and  which were clearly 
infringem ents of the Geneva Convention relating 
to P risoners of W ar.”46 By Ju ly  1942, Falke had  
forced th is  officer ou t and  Major G.D. Hadley, 
RAMC, took over.
Hadley was the SBMO when about one-third 
of th e  C a n a d ia n  c a s u a l t i e s  r e a c h e d  
Obermassfeld in August 1942. An RAMC medical 
o rderly  a t O berm assfe ld  rem em b ered  th e ir  
arrival clearly:
M ost of the  [D ieppe ca su a ltie s]  re a c h e d  u s  still 
w ith  th e  o rig inal field or shell d re ss in g s  app lied  
to the ir in ju rie s .. .A n u m b e r  of th em  w ere in  very 
p oo r sh a p e . All o u r  fellows sp ra n g  to ac tion , 
su rg e o n s  w o rk in g  f la t o u t, o rd e r lie s  liftin g  
them selves to new  heigh ts of endeavour. For once 
th e  h a rs h ly  im p o sed  ru le s  of ligh ts  o u t a t  n in e  
o’clock w ere w aived a n d  o p e ra tio n s  w e n t on  
th ro u g h  the n ig h t a n d  th e  following n ig h t.47
Also extremely helpful for the Dieppe casualties 
w as th e  e x is te n c e  of a fu n c tio n in g  b lood  
t ra n s fu s io n  serv ice  a t  O b erm assfe ld , w ith  
m edical staff an d  convalescent p a tien ts  as the 
donors. When the C anadians arrived on a  French 
am bulance train, they had  been badly neglected. 
Two team s of su rgeons operated  continuously  
for more th an  24 hours; blood transfusions were 
needed often, and fortunately were available. The 
C anad ians  were also greatly aided by the fact 
th a t they arrived in hospital after a short, albeit 
painful, battle and  th u s  retained the full benefit 
of their excellent physical condition.
Although a few of the C anadians succum bed 
to their w ounds and  ensuing com plications, the 
m ajority did well a t Obermassfeld. They had  the 
benefit of first-ra te  m edical an d  surgical care, 
d e s p ite  th e  d e f ic ie n c ie s  of s u p p lie s  a n d  
e q u ip m e n t th a t  p la g u e d  all G e rm an  POW 
e s ta b l i s h m e n ts .  W hen  th e  I n te r n a t io n a l  
C om m ittee of the  Red C ross [ICRC] v isited  
O berm assfeld in  October 1942, they found th a t 
M ajor Hadley h a d  ten  o ther m edical officers to 
a ss is t him  in ru n n in g  the hospital. The w ards 
were large and  well ventilated, w ith double-tier 
beds for the ORs and, in the officers’ ward, single 
beds. The opera ting  room  w as described  as 
“prim itive b u t c lean .” New in s tru m e n ts  were 
needed, however. The x-ray installation was “very 
satisfactory.”48 Finally, morale was good, thanks 
in large p a rt to the  m edical staff. Praise for the 
h a rd  work an d  dedication  of the  B ritish  Army
medical orderlies w as general, from patien ts and 
from the m edical officers.49
b. K loster Haina
One of the m ore in te resting  POW m edical e s tab lish m en ts  w as a t K loster H aina, a 
sm all village east of F rankfurt-am -M ain , in a 
fo rm e r  C is te r c ia n  A bbey  t h a t  P h ilip  th e  
M agnanim ous converted into a m ental hospital 
four centuries earlier.50 Kloster H aina existed as 
a  POW estab lishm en t only from the spring  of 
1942 un til October 1943, though it h ad  a m uch 
longer an d  con tinu ing  existence as an  in sane  
asylum . P art of the  build ing  w as u sed  for the 
w ounded POWs, while som e of the  rem aining 
sections continued  in  their original function.51
T hrough  the  efforts of St. D u n s ta n ’s (a 
tra in in g  school for the  b lind  in  the  U nited 
Kingdom), the B ritish  Red Cross, the  O rder of 
St. Jo h n  of Jerusalem , the ICRC, the YMCA, and 
two Allied POWs, M ajor David L. C h arte rs , 
RAMC, an  ophthalm ic su rgeon  from Liverpool 
who w as captured in Greece, and L ieutenant the 
M arquess of Norm anby, of the G reen Howards, 
who w as w ounded and  cap tu red  near D unkirk, 
th e  POW h o s p i ta l  w a s  e s ta b l i s h e d  a s  a 
convalescent centre specializing in POWs blinded 
as a resu lt of w ounds.52 All anglophone blind 
POWs were collected here, along w ith a large 
n um ber of am putees. The original G erm an staff 
was headed  by the Chefarzt, Stabsarzt Dr. Erich 
Z eiss, w ith  a n  A s s is ta n ta r z t, O berarzt Dr. 
H elm uth  Ju n g . The SBMO in the sum m er of 
1942 w as M ajor Jo h n  Chapel, RAMC.53
W hen C harte rs  arrived a t K loster H aina in 
J u n e  1942, the  b lind  school h ad  five teachers 
m in istering  to 40 blind POWs. At th a t time, 
Kloster H aina held 246 British patien ts  (housed 
separa te ly  in two wings of the m ain  building), 
200 F rench  patien ts , an d  600 G erm an lunatics 
in sep ara te  q u a rte rs .54 D espite the specialist 
in terests of Charters, m ost of the patien ts a t this 
new  cam p w ere am p u tees , in c lu d in g  m any 
C anad ians, a  few RCAF POW casua lties  before 
Dieppe an d  m any survivors of the ra id  from 
Septem ber 1942 on.
In Septem ber, the  pa tien t popu lation  had  
increased  to 382, p lu s four MOs, eight m edical 
orderlies, one m asseur, two blind teachers, one 
padre , an d  an  orderly. Almost ha lf the pa tien ts
C landestine photograph show ing limb-making departm ent a t Stalag 8B, Lamsdorf,..ca. 1944.
P O W  in r ig h t fo r e g r o u n d  is  A r th u r  W es to n , w h o  e s ta b l i s h e d  th is  d e p a r tm e n t  u n d e r  th e  g u id a n c e  
o f  L ie u te n a n t-C o lo n e l T.H. W ilson , R A M C , th e  S e n io r  B r it is h  M ed ica l O fficer in  th e  ca m p .
were Canadian. Conditions were less th an  ideal. 
The supply  of surgical in s tru m e n ts  an d  o ther 
m edical equipm ent an d  supp lies w as deficient 
for w hat Dr. C harte rs  h ad  been  a ssu re d  would 
be “the only ophthalmologic centre for prisoners 
of w ar in G erm any.”55 By all accounts, C harters 
did effective work w ith w hat w as available.
M o d e rn  f a c i l i t ie s  n e e d e d  fo r th e  
rehab ilita tion  of am pu tees were also scarce. 
Im p ro v is a t io n  p ro v id e d  m u c h , n o t  o n ly  
rehabilitative ap p a ra tu s , b u t also p ro sth eses  
them selves. At least one C anadian from Dieppe, 
Howard Large of the E ssex Sco ttish  Regiment, 
a n  a m p u te e  w h o se  leg  w a s  re m o v e d  a t  
Obermassfeld, occupied him self over m any long 
m o n th s  by  d e v is in g  fu n c t io n a l ,  if R u b e  
G oldbergesque, artificial lim bs in  concert w ith 
several o ther volunteers.56
In th e  l a s t  m o n th s  of 1 9 4 2 , so m e  
o r g a n iz a t io n  to o k  p la c e  in  p ro v id in g  
r e h a b il i ta t io n  se rv ic es  to a m p u te e s . N ine 
m edical o rderlies a n d  th ree  m a sse u rs  were 
available to work w ith the 200-p lus am pu tees. 
ICRC represen ta tives reported  th a t a room  for 
“m ecconotherapy,” or physical therapy, had  been 
se t u p  w ith  a p p a ra tu s  m ade by th e  POWs. 
Moreover, a C ap tain  Laurie, who h ad  been  a 
teacher in  physical tra in ing  a t Aberdeen before 
the war, h a d  volunteered to go to Kloster H aina 
and  superv ise  the  rehab ilita tion  p rogram . And
finally, every 15 days they were visited by Major 
Bill Tucker, a B ritish orthopaedic specialist. On 
h is  reco m m en d a tio n , p a tie n ts  who n eeded  
trea tm en t n o t available a t K loster H aina were 
sen t to O berm assfeld or to a G erm an Special 
Lazaret.57
M any  of th e  n o n - m e d ic a l  p ro b le m s  
experienced  a t  K loster H aina seem  to have 
stem m ed from a comm on source - the Chefarzt, 
Dr. Ju n g , who h ad  tak en  over com m and from 
Dr. Z e iss . J u n g  h a d  im p o se d  s t r ic t  ru le s  
preventing no t only the p a tien ts  b u t also the 
medical staff from moving abou t in the evening. 
This restric tion  com plicated the work of the 
doctors an d  orderlies, who h ad  to send  for a 
g uard  -  n o t always available -  to allow them  to 
go and see their patients. Moreover, Ju n g ’s policy 
had  one effect th a t im pacted on everyone in the 
in s t i tu t io n ;  it m ad e  co m m o n  re c re a t io n s  
im p o ss ib le , e sp ec ia lly  th e  o rg an iz a tio n  of 
concerts an d  o ther show s, and  also prevented 
the m en from tak ing  p a rt in s tu d y  courses.58
This m atte r  of collective p u n ish m en t, itself 
a contravention of the Geneva Convention, was 
a m ajor issue. The SBMO pointed out that, after 
a n  a tte m p te d  e sca p e  by two officers (one 
C a n a d ian  a n d  one A m erican), J u n g  p laced  
restric tions on the hosp ita l as a whole. These 
included n o t issu ing  Red Cross food, closing all 
windows, except fanlights, closing all exits into
the courtyard, and  forbidding all exercise in  the 
open air. An ICRC inspecto r noted th a t  the  two 
“e s c a p e r s ” h a d  n o t even  left th e  h o s p ita l  
buildings b u t merely spen t the n ight in  ano ther 
block. T hus he found it “particularly  u n ju s t and 
h a rd  th a t  the  above re s tr ic tio n s  sh o u ld  as 
collective p u n ish m e n t also be im p o sed  on 
p risoners who could never hope to escape or 
even th ink  of it, su ch  as the totally blind or m ost 
of the am pu tees .”59
Despite these k inds of petty oppression, the 
sp irit of the m en w as in general excellent. One 
pa tien t, a C anad ian  from the E ssex  Scottish, 
cherishes a group pho tograph  tak en  a t Kloster 
H aina. He had  h ad  a leg am pu ta ted , as h a d  a 
large n um ber of the  POWs shown. But, as he 
pointed out, he was easy to find because  he had  
carefully seated him self next to the one m an who 
w as a  double am putee. The p ictu re  w as to be 
sen t hom e, so h is m other could see th a t he was 
far from being the m ost seriously  in ju red .60
Again, as a t O berm assfeld, local G erm an 
b u reau c racy  an d  petty  m eanness  could  not 
p reven t the m en from obtaining h igh-quality  
m edical an d  n u rs in g  care. And for the  vast 
m ajority of the m en they received th is care from 
fellow POWs.
Kloster H aina w as closed in late October 
1943, after the majority of the POW patients went 
h o m e in  th e  f ir s t  la rg e  r e p a tr ia t io n . The 
rem a in in g  p a tie n ts  a n d  m edical s ta ff  were 
transferred  to Bad S oden /S alm unster.81
c. H ildburghausen
W h e n  the D ieppe c a su a ltie s  a rriv ed  a t H ild b u rg h au sen  in  A u g u s t/S ep te m b e r 
1942, they found a  sm all POW hospital th a t had  
been  in existence since soon after the  fall of 
D unkirk . The first m edical officer there , who 
rem ained  as SBMO un til the m iddle of 1943, 
was Lieutenant-Colonel T. Henry Wilson, RAMC, 
late of the  21st B ritish  General H ospital.62
T h e  H i ld b u r g h a u s e n  s i te ,  a b o u t  45 
kilom etres east of O berm assfeld, w as a  lunatic  
asylum . Two buildings, some h u nd reds of yards 
apart, were assigned for use as the POW hospital; 
one build ing w as a  p a rt of the asylum , an d  the 
second w as on a nearby  farm  belonging to the 
in s t i tu t io n .63 T he su rg ic a l d iv is io n  of th e  
hospital, in the building known as Frauenhaus,
had  a capacity of 95 beds, and  internal medicine, 
w ith 15 beds, w as allo tted  a build ing  called 
Karolinenburg. The patien t w ards had  from four 
to 14 iron beds which, the inspectors found, had 
“anim al h a ir m a ttresses , two sheets  an d  two 
woollen b lan k e ts .” The sheets  were changed 
every  th re e  o r fo u r w eeks, “m ore  o ften  if 
n ecessa ry .”64 Hot w ater existed in  good supply, 
hot b a th s  or showers were available a t least once 
a week, a n d  there  w as a ho t-a ir a p p a ra tu s  for 
disinfecting clothing an d  bedding.
Food w as basically  adequate , though  some 
com plain ts s tem m ed  from  the heavy u se  of 
caraw ay seed as a  flavouring. The food was 
p repared  by G erm an personnel, and  no control 
w as exerc ised  by th e  POWs. Nor w ere the 
con ten ts  of Red C ross parcels accepted  by the 
k itchen  for incorporation into the cooked meals, 
as was done at m ost POW hospitals. On the other 
h a n d , a b o u t  20 p a t ie n ts  rece ived  d ie ta ry  
supplem ents from the kitchens, including white 
b read , w heat flakes, rolled oats, an d  soup, on 
the  p rescrip tion  of the  POW MOs.65 Unlike the 
p a t ie n ts ,  th e  m e d ic a l s ta f f  h a d  fa c ili tie s  
perm itting  them  to p repare  their own food to 
their liking.
We know  a  little  a b o u t specific m edical 
m e th o d s  u s e d  a t  t h i s  l a z a r e t  a n d , by  
extrapolation, we can  assum e their general use 
w ith C anad ian  an d  o ther POWs. Men who had  
diarrhoea were treated  with calomel (a m ercuric 
com pound of considerable antiquity), anim al 
charcoal, and  milk. The physician who observed 
th is  trea tm en t no ted  th a t  it “would be classed  
as good by the G erm an doctor,” b u t it w as not 
a s  effective as  d rug  therap ies th en  available -  
b u t  n o t in  G erm an POW cam ps. At th is  sam e 
lazaret a diabetic POW had  been 25 days without 
insulin , w hich the G erm ans could no t or would 
no t supply, and w hich had  been requested  from 
Geneva.66
This question of the availability of medicines 
w as a  cause  of g rea t concern  to POW m edical 
officers. A lthough som e drugs were obtained 
from the G erm ans, these  seem  never to have 
b e e n  in  la rg e  q u a n ti t ie s  an d , a s  th e  w ar 
p rogressed , th is  source becam e increasingly 
u n re liab le . An a n a ly s is  m ade la te  in  1942 
indicated th a t the supply of m orphine and  opium 
w ould be totally expended by J u n e  or Ju ly  of 
1943; in  the  m eantim e, “it is reported  by a 
re liab le  so u rc e  th a t  m o rp h in e  is g iven  to
prisoners in the following order: British, French, 
Polish, an d  lastly, the R u ss ian s .”67 In travenous 
a n a e s th e t ic  a g e n ts  w ere m a n u fa c tu re d  in  
G erm an y  a n d  th e re  sh o u ld  have  b e e n  no 
sh o rta g e . E th e r  a n d  ch lo ro fo rm  h a d  b e e n  
reported  as scarce in som e areas. Since M arch 
1940, iodine could be ob tained  only w ith  a 
prescrip tion and  tinctu re  of iodine was reduced  
in iodine con ten t from 10 p e rcen t to 5 percent. 
B ut as w ith IV anaesthetics , m any an tisep tics  
were m ade in G erm any and  there  shou ld  have 
been a plentiful supply. Paper bandages of poor 
m anu factu re  were widely u sed  in G erm any, a 
fac t com m on ly  re fe rre d  to  by  POW s w ho 
regarded  them  as inadequate  su b s titu te s  for 
cotton.68
S erio u s su rg ica l cases  w ere h a n d le d  a t 
Obermassfeld, b u t m uch surgery was carried out 
a t Hildburghausen, where the SBMO, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Wilson, was seen as “very conscientious 
and  highly esteem ed by the G erm an doctors of 
the laza re t.”69 U nfortunately, by the tim e the 
C anad ians arrived a new  Chefarzt h a d  tak en  
over, and  relations betw een th is m an, Stabsarzt 
Dr. Falkenberg, and  Wilson were never good. 
After a n u m b er of confrontations, Falkenberg  
w on. He ro se  in  r a n k  from  S ta b s a r z t  to  
O berstabsarzt, while Wilson w as ban ish ed  to 
Oflag 9A/H Spangenberg, where he was no longer 
doing m edical work.70 Later, he was transferred  
to Lam sdorf and  took charge of the lazaret there.
d. Stadtroda and Egendorf
T h e  h o s p i ta l  t r a in  c a r ry in g  C a n a d ia n  casua lties  from R ouen to S tad troda  took 
four days to reach  its destination , a d istance  of 
only abou t 500 kilom etres. The S tad troda  POW 
Hospital, located in Wehrkreis 9 as a Reserve  
Lazaret a ttach ed  to S talag  9C, w as in  a two- 
s to ry  bu ild ing , w ith  B ritish  a n d  C a n a d ia n  
p a tien ts  in a large w ard on the m ain  floor. Late 
in August 1942, it received 70 Dieppe casualties, 
th u s  effectively filling its ra ted  bed capacity  of 
200 .71 S tad troda  h ad  severe lim itations as  a 
hospital; for example, the supply of latrines was 
grossly deficient, a serious problem  in a hospital 
setting.
The Egendorf POW lazaret, located in the 
country near Weimar, occupied a stone building 
t h a t  h a d  p re v io u s ly  b e e n  u s e d  a s  a 
Reichsjuhrerschule. The bed capacity was about
250, an d  there  was an  all-British m edical staff, 
a lthough  m ost of the p a tien ts  were no t British. 
For exam ple, in October 1942 there  were four 
medical officers and  21 medical orderlies to care 
for 252 pa tien ts; 59 were “B ritish ,” including 
48 C anadians from Dieppe, while the rem aining 
193 w ere  B e lg ian , F re n c h , S e rb ia n , a n d  
R u ss ia n .72 The SBMO w as C ap ta in  Cooper, 
RAMC. T he la z a re t  h a d  b e e n  e s ta b l is h e d  
expressly as a typhus hospital, and  each patien t 
w ent th rough a delousing p lan t before entering. 
However, neu tra l inspectors reported in October 
1942 th a t  “there  is no ty phus case here  and  
therefore p a tien ts  w ith any kind of d iseases are 
b rough t here from the nearby  w ork-cam ps.”73
Inspectors found m any favourable topics for 
com m ent a t Egendorf. The British cooked the 
food them selves, ra th e r  th a n  the G erm ans. 
A rrangem ents had  been m ade with the Chefarzt, 
S tabsarzt Dr. Seuw en, to perm it the m edical 
staff to have the  use of the electricity into the 
evening. The m edical personnel were perm itted  
to take  w alks, on parole, a lthough  the spo rts  
field n e a r the  hosp ita l w as tem porarily  closed 
as a reprisal for the escape of two MOs, Captains 
G ibbons and  Deane, in early 1942. Medically, 
E g e n d o rf  se e m e d  to fu n c t io n  effec tively . 
T reatm en ts  beyond the capacity  of the m edical 
staff, including  the u se  of x-rays, were carried  
out in Weimar. Dental work was perform ed by a 
civilian d e n tis t in nea rb y  B lankenhain , b u t 
d en tu res  h a d  to be ordered th rough  the m ain  
Stalag, a  process tha t produced lengthy delays.74
5. The Geneva Conventions
At Kloster Haina, Major C harters accused the G erm ans of violating several Articles of the 
Geneva Convention of 27 Ju ly  1929, Relative to 
the  T re a tm e n t of P riso n ers  of War; sim ila r 
charges were m ade with respect to o ther cam ps 
w hich held  C anad ian  p risoners. The violations 
th a t involved the sick and  w ounded, an d  the 
s ta tu s  of P ro te c te d  P e rso n n e l, w ere m o st 
commonly of three types. First, there was alleged 
failure to provide sufficien t food or m edical 
supplies (which h as  already been  d iscussed  in 
some detail). Secondly, there were allegations of 
g roup  rep risa ls . And th ird ly , there  w as the 
charge of failing to rep a tria te  bo th  the severely 
w ounded and the seriously ill, as well as su rp lus 
Protected Personnel.
Funeral o f a POW, Germany.
a. Reprisals
A rticle 46 of the Convention on POWs covered 
. i l p e n a l  sanctions against POWs, and  specified 
th a t collective penalties for individual ac ts were 
p ro h ib ited . M oreover, Article 2 s ta te d  th a t  
“M e a s u re s  of r e p r i s a l  a g a in s t  th e m  a re  
p roh ib ited .” In som e of the  in stances  charged, 
reprisal was avowedly carried out and  no defence 
w as possible. In o thers, a ttem pts were m ade to 
justify the behaviour. One m echanism  attem pted 
against POW hospitals was to refer to the Geneva 
Convention on Sick and  Wounded, where Article 
7 s ta te s :  “The p ro te c tio n  d u e  to  s a n ita ry  
formations and establishm ents shall cease if they 
are used  to commit acts injurious to the enem y.” 
This w ould seem  to have been the  legalistic 
u nderp inn ing  of an  order issued  to the  2 /5 th  
A ustralian  General Hospital after its cap tu re  in 
Greece in 1941: “From  Routine O rder No. 3, 28 
April 1941, Change of Com m and: 1. d. Any 
action tow ards escaping or contrary  to m ilitary 
discipline or harm fu l to the G erm an Com m and 
will resu lt in the hospital ceasing to hold medical 
privileges."75
Disputes of this n a tu re  are difficult to resolve 
to m u tu a l sa tisfac tion . B ut there  seem s no 
question  th a t collective p un ishm en ts  of several 
varieties were carried ou t against C anadian  and 
o th er POWs as rep risa ls  for various ac ts  or 
alleged acts. The m ost celebrated  of these, and  
one of the m ost dram atic to affect w estern POWs 
during  the war, w as the  infam ous shackling  
order of October 1942.
T he b ro a d  is s u e s  c o n n e c te d  w ith  th e  
shack ling  of Allied an d  G erm an POWs canno t 
be en tered  into h ere .76 B ut a p ertinen t question 
is w hether or not Protected Personnel or patients 
were m ade to suffer th is  reprisal. C ertainly it 
can  be sa id  th a t lazare ts  and  reviers were not 
generally  su b jec t to shackling . At lea s t one 
C anad ian  veteran  of Dieppe wrote after the w ar 
th a t he h ad  been tied up  bo th  before and  after a 
h e rn ia  operation  early in 1943.77 B u t he was 
chained  only after being re tu rn ed  to the sta lag  
c o m p o u n d , w h e n  p r e s u m a b ly  h e  h a d  
recuperated and was considered once again “fit.”
It seem s reasonab le  to conclude th a t  the 
m ajor rep risa l of shackling, in effect for more 
th a n  13 m onths, w as no t used  against pa tien ts  
of any nationality. T hus th is m easure w as not a 
fa c to r  in  e x a m in in g  th e  fa te  of w o u n d e d  
C anad ians  from Dieppe, a lthough  there  is a t 
least one piece of evidence indicating th a t  the 
G erm ans threatened to tie up  C anadian patients 
in  the  L am sdorf Lazaret. Fred Hesk, a n  RAMC 
orderly there, rem em bers th a t
th ey  s ta r te d  c h a in in g  th e  C a n a d ia n s  a n d  they  
com p la in ed  th a t  th e re  w e re n 't en o u g h . They 
w a n te d  to  com e a n d  c h a in  th e  ones in  h o sp ita l.
A nd w e sa id , “No, we w o u ld n 't a cc e p t it. C h a in  
u s  in s tead .” Well, they th o u g h t ab o u t it, a n d  th en  
th ey  rea lized  it th a t  if th ey  ch a in e d  th e  RAMC 
th e y ’d  have  nobo d y  to  do th e  n u rs in g . So they  
dec ided  th ey  w ou ld  m ak e  th e  n u m b e r  u p  w ith  
RAF p e rso n n e l.78
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b. Repatriation
It m ay have been  deliberate policy on the  p a rt of the  G erm ans to re ta in  as m any Protected 
Personnel as possible in their territory. Certainly, 
the m ore active Allied POW MOs an d  m edical 
orderlies were in caring for th e ir  own m en, the 
less w as required  of G erm an physic ians and  
o ther m edical personnel. Ultimately th is m ean t 
th a t more G erm an doctors were available for the 
W ehrm acht as well as the hom e front.
The first successfu l repa tria tion  of grands  
b lesses  an d  Protected Personnel took place in 
O ctober 1943. The rep a tria te s  arrived in the 
United Kingdom from G othenberg, Sw eden, on 
24 an d  25 October, the  w alk ing  cases  a n d  
P rotected Personnel a t Leith, having sailed  on 
HMT E m press o f R u ssia  and  SS Drottingholm, 
and  s tre tch e r cases, having sailed on Atlantis, 
a t Liverpool. The total num ber of repatriates was 
4 ,1 5 9 :  2 ,6 5 8  d is a b le d , 1 ,2 4 4  P r o te c te d  
Personnel, 152 m erch an t seam en , a n d  105 
civilian in te rnees. The C anad ian  con tingen t 
com prised  44 co m b atan t p e rsonne l a n d  six 
Protected Personnel (Captain R.R. Laird and  five 
medical orderlies, Corporal G.A. Fletcher, Royal 
Regiment of Canada, Corporal H.V. Jones, Royal 
Ham ilton Light Infantry, Sergeant D.H. Jo rdan , 
S o u th  S a s k a tc h e w a n  R eg im en t, C o rp o ra l 
Corporal G. Pasquill, Q ueen’s Own C am eron 
H ig h la n d e rs  of C a n a d a , a n d  S e rg e a n t  L. 
S tephenson, Essex Scottish  Regiment).79
6. Escaping from POW 
H ospitals and Lazarets
An o th e r  is su e  th a t  b e a rs  m en tion  is the  m orality of escaping from m edical facilities 
used  for the care of POWs. This is quite separate  
from the appropria teness of a ttem p ts to escape 
in general.80 Since Canadian POW -patients could 
be affected by reprisals th a t often were im posed 
after escapes, d iscussion  of the  issu es  seem s 
relevant.
The question  carries different ram ifications 
for m edical personnel and  for p a tien ts  or n o n ­
m ed ical s taff. For th e  f irs t g roup  a  m ora l 
im perative would seem  to be in effect w hereby 
m edical officers, m edical orderlies, a n d  n u rse s  
do not abandon  patien ts whom  they are actively 
caring for a t  the  tim e of a pro jected  escape
attem pt. On the o ther han d , w here no p a tien ts  
are u n d e r care, m edical personnel would seem  
to have the sam e righ t -  and  duty? -  to escape 
as do o ther POWs.
Nevertheless, the m atter is not a simple one. 
Technically, u n d e r  the  Geneva C onvention of 
1929 (and the 1949 revision), cap tu red  m edical 
officers an d  orderlies are no t POWs, b u t ra th e r  
are designated as Protected Personnel. Su rp lus 
P r o te c te d  P e r s o n n e l ,  u n d e r  th e  s a m e  
in te rnationa l agreem ent, are to be re tu rn ed  to 
their hom e jurisdiction. Can one “escape” if one 
is n o t a p risoner?  A nother question  w as the 
s t a t u s  o f v o lu n te e r  m e d ic a l  o r d e r l ie s .  
Technically, they were no t Protected Personnel, 
yet they were occupied tending the wounded. The 
m oral p re ssu re s  have been  well expressed  by 
Steve Michell, describing his hosp ita l-tra in  ride 
into captivity in  Germany:
M any tim es I'd look o u t a t  th e  F ren ch  lan d scap e  
w ith  th e  n o tio n  of ju m p in g  o u t of a  w indow  after 
d a r k .  T h e n  I’d lo o k  b a c k  a t  a ll th e  p o o r  
b e d rid d e n  guys in th e  coach . If 1 took off, w ho 
w o u ld  ch an g e  th e ir  b a n d a g e s  a n d  ten d  th e ir  
p u tre fy in g  w o u n d s?  O h, to hell w ith  it; m an y  of 
th em  h a d  little enough ch an ce  a s  it w as. w ithou t 
m e ru n n in g  o u t on  th e m .81
P ro u s e , in  th e  n e x t  ra ilw a y  c o a c h , a lso  
considered attem pting to escape. He also decided 
against it, both because of his feeling of obligation 
to his w ounded m ates and  because he knew that 
if he rem ained with the train, ultimately he would 
be reg istered  in a cam p and  h is family would 
learn  th a t he had  survived.82
For non-m edical individuals the issues seem  
clearer. It w as widely accep ted , th o u g h  no t 
p e rh ap s a directive u n d e r m ilitary law, th a t 
POWs h ad  a du ty  to a ttem p t to escape. Given 
this, why not escape from medical installations? 
Officially, and  very widely unofficially as well, it 
w as believed th a t th is  shou ld  no t be done. The 
reason  w as the fear of re ta lia tion  by captors 
against an  entire hospital or lazaret. M ethods of 
reprisal are relatively few in type: deprivation of 
food, of liberty for various activities, and  m ore 
restrictive incarceration. All of these, if effected 
in a hosp ita l, could w orsen the condition of 
pa tien ts  left behind  by escapees.
Conclusions
W h a t  c a n  we c o n c lu d e  fro m  th e s e  o b se rv a tio n s?  It is a re a so n a b le  a n d  
suppo rtab le  generality  th a t C anad ian  troops 
cap tured  a t Dieppe were as well treated  as other 
Allied POWs from the w estern nations. This was 
true of casualties as well as the unin jured . B ut I 
refer to relative conditions. I do not suggest th a t 
our POWs lived in luxury nor that their treatm ent 
w as faultless, m erely th a t  com pared to m any 
o ther na tional groups, it w as better. If one had  
to be a  POW, one’s chances of survival were 
p ro found ly  im proved if one w ere C a n ad ian  
ra th e r  th an  R ussian  or Polish.
In the im m ediate a fte rm a th  of the  raid, 
m edical trea tm en t w as often rough  an d  ready. 
However, excepting always the possible brutality  
of a n  a rd e n t Nazi m edical officer, m edical 
orderly, or nu rse , trea tm en t w as appropria te  
w i th in  re c o g n iz e d  b o u n d s  of t r ia g e  a n d  
em ergency care for large num bers of w ounded.
On the question  of tran sp o rta tio n  of the 
w ounded from the D ieppe/R ouen area to cam ps 
an d  hosp ita ls  in G erm any, the s itu a tio n  is less 
positive. It w as s ta n d a rd  practice in E urope to 
move troops via cattle  cars; they were labelled 
“40 hom m es ou 8 ch e va u x ” a n d  com m only 
referred  to as 40 an d  8s. U nfortunately, m any 
Dieppe casua lties  were moved in  boxcars in 
conditions of filth, w ith insufficient food and  
w ater, an d  w ith lengthy delays for the  d istance 
to be travelled. The provision of hosp ita l tra in s  
an d  ordinary  railway passenger cars  for some 
of the  m en ru le s  o u t the  charge of s tu d ied  
brutality. It seem s a reasonable supposition th a t 
the availability of otherwise unoccupied hospital 
tra in s  w as no t large. By late A ugust 1942 the 
Wehrmacht was sustain ing prodigious casualties 
on the R ussian  front. With the w estern  front 
quiet, a large proportion  of m edical personnel 
and  equipm ent m u st have been concentrated  in 
the east. B ut th a t  situation , if true , does not 
excuse the  failure to provide the  w ounded with 
adequate space, food, water, or medical supplies 
in the boxcars.
Although they may not have realized it a t the 
tim e, the  m en c a p tu re d  a t D ieppe en te red  
captivity in  G erm any a t the  b est possib le time. 
In the last m onths of 1940, with the huge num ber 
of Belgian, F rench, an d  B ritish POWs taken
earlier th a t year, life in the cam ps an d  hospitals 
w as especially hard , producing  conditions th a t 
did n o t exist again  un til the  closing m on ths  of 
the  war. The prisoners had  to be housed , fed, in 
som e cases clothed, an d  m edically trea ted . As 
h a s  been  show n, hosp ita ls  were created  from 
sc ra tch . It took som e tim e for the POWs to be 
p rocessed  and  inform ation se n t to the ICRC in 
Geneva, an d  un til th a t w as accom plished and  
each  m an  was individually registered, no t only 
w ere th e ir  fam ilies a n d  th e ir  g o v ern m en ts  
u n aw are  of th e ir  fate, b u t  also the various 
nationa l Red C ross societies could n o t initiate 
w hat becam e, for w estern  Allied POWs, the flood 
of Red Cross food and  medical parcels. By 1942, 
all of th ese  conditions h ad  stabilized so that, 
w ith isolated exceptions, housing, clothing, and 
food were adequate ly  supplied , con tac t w ith 
fam ilies a t hom e h a d  been  estab lished , an d  life 
w as bearable.
The m edical care of the  Dieppe casua lties  
seem s to have been  a t least adequate  in the 
Dieppe a rea  an d  u sua lly  superio r in the POW 
hosp ita ls  and  lazarets. R eprisals, in pa rticu la r 
shack ling , did n o t affect e ith e r p a tie n ts  or 
m edical personnel. O ther collective m easu res 
were unquestionab ly  m ajor inconveniences b u t 
it is difficult to prove th a t  the condition of any 
casua lty  w as m ade significantly w orse by such  
m easu res. A lthough repatria tion  p lans evolved 
w ith  painful slow ness, w hen repa tria tion  did 
occur, C a n a d ia n  su rv iv o rs  of D ieppe w ere 
accorded the sam e treatm ent as all other Western 
Allied POWs.
In conclusion, it is w orth  com paring the 
s ta tis tic s  of C anad ians cap tu red  in  Hong Kong, 
eight m on ths before the ir Dieppe com patrio ts 
w ent into the bag. Of 1,699 m en captured  by the 
Ja p an e se , 1,418 cam e hom e and  281 died in 
captivity, a  m ortality rate  of nearly 17 per cent.83 
In con trast, of the 1,946 C anadians cap tured  at 
Dieppe, 72 died in captivity, a m ortality  ra te  of 
only four per cent; 1,874 cam e hom e. G ranted, 
som e b ro u g h t  hom e p h y s ic a l a n d  m e n ta l 
problem s th a t con tinue to d istu rb  and  d istress 
them , b u t  th ey  cam e hom e. And th e  large 
m ajority, while losing th ree  years of their lives, 
re tu rn ed  to jobs a n d  families.
To som e degree, cred it for th is  survival rate  
m u s t go to the  m edical officers a n d  m edical 
orderlies, tra ined  an d  volunteer. The G erm ans
created  a  system  of lazarets an d  reviers th a t 
provided a setting where good medical care could 
exist, b u t their involvem ent w as rarely  m ore 
direct. With infrequent exceptions, POWs looked 
after POWs, an d  they did a rem arkab le  job.
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